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Abstract: The postwar period brought not only the division of the world
into two hostile camps but also the need to reconcile and work through the
past wrongdoings. The world was amazed by Willy Brandt’s knee-fall in
Warsaw in 1970, and some of the countries took that as an example of the
perfect reconciliation. Nonetheless, Polish-German apologies were not the
ones that washed away all blame. The war memories still raise many
emotions among the two nations. However, Japan and Korea, two allied
democracies that still struggle with the war memories, frequently point to
the European neighbors as a perfect example of reconciliation. The aim of
this paper is to verify the strengths and weaknesses of European and Asian
reconciliation and to find among them the working patterns for the Balkans,
as well as the failures that should not be repeated. 
Keywords: reconciliation, the Balkans, Europe, East Asia, politics of
remembrance.
INTRODUCTION – RECONCILIATION AND THE POLITICS 
OF REMEMBRANCE
Fascination with other countries which are far away from each other is
widely known all over the world. Due to its soft power2, Japan seems to be
one of the most attractive countries. Korea is nowadays also gaining the
attention of Europeans. European youth stay under the influence of Japanese
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and Korean music, called J-Pop and K-Pop. Germans and Poles read manga,
discuss the latest anime, buy Korean cosmetics and eat sushi or kimchi for
dinner. Japan and Korea, together with their unique culture and art, became
part of the European lifestyle. 
For East Asians, the Western European countries are for decades a
symbol of elitism. The honeymoon tours, young Asians tours organized after
graduation, are aimed to visit the Eiffel Tower, the Colosseum or Big Ben.
Europe benefits from its long history without special care of Asian tourists
when compared with the East Asian ‘soft power’. Germans somehow use
the image of the romantic churches and castles, cozy cafés, and European
chic to attract part of the Korean and Japanese travelers. Poland attempts to
promote its culture with Chopin and traditional crafts. Nonetheless, the
must-see place for Asian tourists is still the symbol of the most tragic history
of the nation: The Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. 
Besides the above-mentioned popular European sites for Asian nations,
there is an issue in European history that raises interest among them. This
issue is reconciliation. 
History is both a factor in the process of remembrance and a dominant
element in Polish-German relations.3 And reconciliation is a process that
aims to soften the past burdens and enables the countries struggling in the
past to establish a proper relationship. It can go back, freeze, or develop.
One of the most important aspects of reconciliation is an apology. 
The term apologia derives from Greek, and it is a term derived from
oratory art, meaning defense speech against charges, as well as the praise
of a person, piece of work or institution (SJP); in everyday speech, it can also
mean justification or apologies. It is worth mentioning that the term
combines conflicting slogans or an apology. It may be noted that the term
apologia combines denial, justification, as well as an expression of repentance.
For the purposes of this article, I focus on the apologies, defined as an
agreement (Benoit, 2009, p. 92), or mea culpa (Tavuchis, 1991), which Jane W.
Yamazaki calls the real apology (2006, p. 2).
This article aims at presenting and analyzing Polish and German paths
for reconciliation. They are considered by Koreans as the one that should be
repeated by Japan towards South Korea.4 Moreover, Japanese-Korean
struggles over history will also be analyzed in this paper to show the failures
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that were committed by Asian nations. This analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of rapprochement attempts in both Europe and Asia aims at
finding the solution and leads for the Western Balkans. 
POLISH-GERMAN PATHS FOR RECONCILIATION
Poland and Germany share not only the memory of World War II
atrocities. They also share 123 years of the occupation policy of Prussia
towards large parts of Western Poland’s territories, which ended in 1918. This
period of occupation and the awareness of not existing Polish territory made
the anti-German sentiment even stronger in the 1920s and the 1930s. The
outbreak of World War II is the most clearly remembered in Polish history as
a period of cruelty and dehumanization. The reconciliation process started
about a decade after the war, and it is a constant course in Polish-German
relations. However, it should be remembered, that the pre- and postwar
situation of both countries was diametrically different. Poland became a part
of the Soviet bloc, and Germany remained divided into the western and
eastern parts. Therefore, the policy of dialogue was conducted from the Polish
side with two different countries, and its own acceptance of Germany’s
gestures and statements was strongly controlled by the Soviet Union. 
One of the most important aspects of the Polish-German dispute was the
question of borders. Even though the agreement between the Polish
government and East Germany (German Democratic Republic) was signed
in 1950 (German-Polish society, 2012), the Polish western borders were still
not recognized by West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany). East
Germany did not also include regulations concerning the border traffic, which
was of special interest to the Polish side. Nonetheless, the borders mentioned
in the 1950 Treaty were agreed to be the official Polish-German borders. The
relations with West Germany were established due to Ostpolitik, initiated in
1969 by the FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt as a normalization policy with the
Central and Eastern European countries. Brandt’s arrival to Warsaw in 1970
brought the Treaty of Warsaw, with acceptance of the existing borders. In the
world’s opinion, however, the most significant moment was the knee-fall of
the German Chancellor in front of the Ghetto Heroes Monument. The picture
of Willy Brandt kneeling in front of the monument, in the center of Warsaw,
became the symbol of post-war apologies and is shown in numerous books
and textbooks, not only in Europe but all over the world, including Asia.5 The
5 However, it should be remembered that the pictures of Willy Brandt kneeling in front of
the monument were prohibited in Poland until 1989. See more in Ruchniewicz, 2019, p. 23.
final step to achieve the political status-quo regarding the borders’ post-war
uncertainty was the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Republic of Poland on the confirmation of the frontier between them (Treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland, 2002),
signed in 1990. It was also supplemented by a Treaty of Good Neighbourship
and Friendly Cooperation, signed in June 1991.
However, one of the most significant aspects of Polish-German
reconciliation happened on the societal level. It was possible, after the
Nuremberg Trials, which took place from November 1945 till October 1946.
The trials recognized the guilt of the Nazis. Having this official confirmation
of Germany’s responsibility, the ground for rebuilding the relations was
ready even the wounds were still opened. 
In August 1948 the Hellmut von Gerlach Society was founded. It aimed
to rebuild political, cultural and economic ties with Poland (Turek, 2018, p.
26). The first step to build the bridge of forgiveness was the cooperation of
Christian churches (both protestant and catholic), which started in the 1950s,
from the first cooperation of the protestant churches and neglecting anti-
Polish stereotypes in their publications (Żurek, 2019, p. 233). In 1964 and
1965, German Christians organized the pilgrimage to Auschwitz, which was
the visible sign of the readiness for the process of reconciliation (Żurek, 2019,
p. 234). The first key-event of Polish-German rapprochement was the
Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops to their German Brothers, ended with
a statement: ‘We forgive and ask for forgiveness’ (Text of the message, 2016).
It seemed to be the most important document in the whole reconciliation
process (Żurek, 2019, p. 237).
The symbolic culmination of the reconciliation process was the mass in
Krzyżowa in Lower Silesia (Szurlej, 2013, p. 31), which took place on 9
November 1989. During this service, the symbolic gesture of the ‘sign of
peace’ occurred between the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki
and the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl. 
Contemporarily, Poland and Germany share the commonwealth in a
supranational organization, which is the European Union (EU). As Justyna
Turek stated, mentioning the experience of Poland and Germany as a tool
for compromise: ‘European countries still grapple with obstacles concerning
the reconciliation process, but Poland-German pattern seems to be a positive
pattern (…). (…) steps of reconciliation based on forgiveness and mutual
understanding – from political level and both societies – may have an
excellent contribution to reconciliation (…). Forgiveness between
adversaries is the first step in building relations and it is possible if we look
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at the European continent’ (Turek, 2018, p. 21). This experience can become
an instrument, which after adjusting to the cultural and historical
understanding, can become a pattern for other countries on how to get
through the most difficult path from two extreme points. As Burkhard
Olschowsky and Robert Żurek claim, without German-French
reconciliation, there would not be the European Union, but without Polish-
German reconciliation, there would not be the EU covering almost the entire
continent (Olschowsky and Żurek, 2013, p. 40).
Poland and Germany were enemies during one of the bloodiest conflicts,
World War II, due to which Poland lost almost 6 million citizens, i.e., 17%
of the pre-war population (Materski and Szarota, 2009). These days, they
share common norms and values inside a supranational organism. It does
not mean that past events do not overshadow the contemporary issues. They
are visible in political propaganda, memorials and common anniversaries.
But the path for understanding was opened. And since reconciliation, which
is an ongoing process, aims at gaining a ‘just memory’, which is a proper
resolution and forgiveness for others and oneself (Lavabre and Nicolaidis,
2009, pp. 87-88), the process between Poland and Germany can serve not as
a perfect, but verified way to become co-partners, even if in not so distant
past the nations could define each other as enemies. 
JAPANESE-KOREAN STRUGGLES OVER THE PAST
The countries that definitely need the process of reconciliation are Japan
and the Republic of Korea. Existing in a quasi-alliance, each of them is allied
with the great-patron/protector – the United States.6 The establishment of
the basic relations between these Asian democracies was caused by the
pressure from the United States (Barbasiewicz, 2018). This ‘push hard’ policy
of American policymakers towards rapprochement in the 1960s, caused the
lack of the process of reconciliation and lasting struggles over history
between both societies. 
The outside pressure became the reason of history being an unworked
issue in the bilateral relations of Japan and Korea. The source of the pressure
was the special interest in sharing the responsibility of guaranteeing the
security from the Japanese side to the Republic of Korea, during the
increased American involvement in the Vietnam War. Together with forced
6 This theory was developed by Victor D. Cha (2000).
reconciliation, the incising sense of unfairness started to deepen in Japanese
society. Japan, which was the aggressor during the war, due to its
demilitarization, became one of the main suppliers of the American army
fighting in Vietnam, while South Korea had to send the second largest
contingent to support the US in the war.7 This situation caused the Korean
human losses and the involvement in the next conflict, not that long after
World War II and the Korean War. Japan, at the same time, benefiting from
being the demilitarized country started its economic growth, leaving the rest
of Asian countries far behind.8
The first attempts from the Japanese Emperor’s side to express
reconciliation started in the 1980s. On 6 September 1984, Japanese Emperor
Hirohito held in his palace a party for South Korean President, Chun Doo
Hwan. During the toast, he referred to the difficult past with words ‘It is
indeed regrettable, that there was an unfortunate past between us for a
period in this century, and I believe that it should not be repeated again’
(Haberman, 1990, p. 1). Soon after Hirohito passed away, Akihito, who
succeeded, apologized to Korean President Roh Tae Woo while saying: ‘I
think of the sufferings your people underwent during this unfortunate
period, which was brought about by my country, and cannot but feel the
deepest regret’ (Weisman, 1984, p. 5). This visit of the Korean president also
became a possibility to draw attention to the “comfort women” issue. This
was the beginning of how in the 1990s a new and ongoing historical struggle
over the comfort women issue has started. Some scholars assume that about
70% of all comfort women were from Korea (Hicks, 1999, p. 113). The South
Korean Women’s and Church Women’s Alliances and the Seoul District
Female Students’ Representative Council decided to ask President Roh to
tackle the issue in Japan (Hicks, 1999, p. 113). The Korean president did not
answer to this request, but the Korean Foreign Ministry requested the
cooperation from the Japanese side in compiling a list of all wartime labor
draftees (Hicks, 1999, p. 114). Soon after, the Socialists raised the issue in the
Japanese Parliament. When the Japanese government denied, the anger
among the ex-comfort women started to rise, and Kim Hak Sun decided for
an official testimony. This led to the first lawsuits in Japan. When the
Japanese government claimed that the documents concerning the issue were
missing, Yoshimi Yoshiaki found the official papers in the Library of the
National Institute for Defense Studies and delivered them as proof. The case
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of the comfort women became officially confirmed and a vivid issue in
Japanese-Korean relations.
The change in the Japanese government and the period the Liberal
Democratic Party lost the majority, led the Socialists to the PMs position.
One of them was Murayama Tomiichi. He was the one, who made a
statement on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of World War II, considered
by many as the closest to perfection. Murayama apologized: ‘(…) In the hope
that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility,
these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of
deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my
feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of
that history (…)’ (Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, 1995).
Nonetheless, the usage of the issue of history in the political campaigns and
the struggles over comfort women reparation caused not only political but
also social hate. 
The survey conducted among Japanese and Koreans from 2013 clearly
shows that almost half of each society have bad impressions about each
other. This does not help in building a common future and reconciliation.
Besides the comfort women issue, the other ‘burning points’ are the
territorial disputes (Takeshima/Dokdo Islands), and the lack of proper
recognition from the Japanese government side (The Genron NPO and East
Asia Institute, 2018).
The public opinion is formed by the actions undertaken by Japanese and
Korean political and social actions that bring back to mind the past
happenings. For example, before the first survey, in 2012 the Korean president
visited disputed islands (Sang-Hun, 2012). The world was also informed of
the willingness of the Korean side to construct an airport next to the islands
(Nam, 2014). On the Japanese side, the actions of local politicians, as well as
the statements made by the Prime Minister, also angered Koreans. For
example, the statement by the mayor of Osaka, claiming that the comfort
women were necessary for Japan’s wartime soldiers (‘Comfort women’, 2013)
brought much criticism not only in Korea but worldwide.
Even when Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and Korean President
Park Geun Hye decided on the agreement on reparations for the sex slaves
from Korea in 2015, it became the next issue of the struggle on history and
apologies, which ended with a withdrawal of diplomats of both countries.
The unwillingness on the Korean side could be caused by Abe’s statement
on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. He
mentioned Korea among others who suffered from Japanese war actions,
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but with the emphasis that Japan ‘repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep
remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war’ and was
‘consistently devoted to the peace and prosperity of the region since the end
of the war’ (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015). This showed
the entire world that Japan does not wish to apologize anymore, and the
younger generations are not responsible for the war. 
The above-mentioned, selected issues on Japanese history show how
without the previous steps to the mutual forgiveness and understanding,
every word in political speech, and every political or social action can become
a great issue in bilateral relations. For sure, Japan and Korea are the countries
that show the bad influence the lack of reconciliations has for the entire society.  
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF POLISH-GERMAN
RECONCILIATION AS A LESSON FOR THE BALKANS
The above-mentioned process of Polish-German rapprochement and
Japanese-Korean struggles over history do not mention the sole success of
the first ones and the failures of the second pair of the countries. Poland and
Germany still are the place of the historical disputes, but they established
the benefits of coexisting as partners in different organizations, from which
the most important and integrating are the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). It does not mean that Japan and South Korea do not
participate in common organizations or do not share the security policy. But
compared to Poland and Germany, they share only a common security
patron – the United States, without being equal partners within bigger
organizations, and – as it was shown above – without being equal partners
within the triangular alliance (although the strongest feelings towards this
state were during the Cold War period). 
One of the strongest points of Polish-German cooperation is on the
societal level. Different NGOs and organizations participate in establishing
the Polish-German dialogue. One of the most important factors in building
an understanding between the parties is the youth exchange program. A
great example is the Polish-German Youth Cooperation. As it states in the
mission: ‘equality and partnership are the foundations of our activity. We
work in a Polish-German team, we speak both languages, we are present in
both countries’.9 These words are the best explanation of the success
9 For detailed information visit the official website: https://www.pnwm.org/o-pnwm/
misja-i-wizja/.
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benefiting from building foundations for good neighborly relations between
Poles and Germans. The Erasmus exchange program financed by the
European Commission also helps Polish-German cooperation, making
Germany one of the most frequently chosen countries for studying of Polish
students, and German students as one of the most frequently studying at
Polish universities (PL – one of the most popular Erasmus destination, 2014).
The next important step was establishing the Polish-German Textbook
Commission, which is preparing one textbook on history, after agreeing on
the universal version of the history of both Polish and German sides. Until
today three textbooks were delivered to history teachers. The scope of topics
in the published textbooks covers the period from prehistory until World
War I and is defined as ‘multi perspective’ (Araszkiewicz, 2019, p. 15). The
textbooks enforce the youths in understanding the past, which strengthens
the willingness of students in searching and interpreting the sources, as well
as looking for their credibility (Araszkiewicz, 2019, p. 15). 
The weakest point in the attempts to reach full reconciliation and getting
to a ‘just memory’ point is the lack of awareness on the German side of the
atrocities committed on Polish citizens, with the parallel cultivation of this
national tragedy in the Polish memory (Schmidt, 2019, p. 10). In Germany,
Polish-German reconciliation is not appreciated, mostly because of the
existing lack of interest in Eastern Europe and the biggest appreciation of
German-French reconciliation (Olschowsky and Żurek, 2013, p. 40).
Consequently, the interesting result comes from the relations between
Japan and South Korea. There is a significant interest in Korean pop culture,
which causes a positive attitude of Japanese towards Korans (among all the
negative attitudes presented in the previous chapter).10 It shows that besides
the significant interest in the other country, reconciliation does not happen.
However, the actions aiming for the commemoration of the Polish
victims in Berlin bring the hope of changing the lack of understanding on
the German side. As one of the co-initiators, Leo Mausbach claims ‘A Polish
tourist who visits the sites commemorating World War II in the center of
Berlin, will find in the Tiergarten district a monument in honor of Soviet
soldiers, a monument in honor of the murdered Sinti and Roma, a memorial
to homosexuals persecuted by Nazism and Holocaust memorial. He will
also find places commemorating the German resistance movement and
10 Around 50% of Japanese have a positive attitude towards Korea thanks to music, drama,
or culture (The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, 2019, p. 6).
German suffering (…). Poland, in which there were the most victims of war
in relation to the population, does not have its appropriate place here [in
Berlin] to commemorate these victims and honor Polish resistance’
(Mausbach, 2019, p. 11). It is very important since numerous scholars
mention that the biggest obstacle to full reconciliation is the lack of
awareness of the Polish nation that Germans call for honoring the Polish
victims and the role of the Polish underground in World War II. However,
on the political level, the remembrance of the atrocities committed against
Poland is well remembered. For example, in the Bundestag, Angela Merkel
recalled on the 75th anniversary of the attack on Poland the responsibility of
Germany in starting the war (Merkel reminds, 2014).
However, the researchers mention also the Polish politicians’ approaches
to destroy rapprochement while using the anti-German sentiment in their
statements. The renowned Polish historian, Krzysztof Ruchniewicz (2019)
mentions the changes that appeared in Polish society – blaming the Polish
side for the worsening in relations between Poland and Germany. He
referred to the public opinion survey conducted in 2017, in which according
to Polish citizens the relations with Germany have worsened.11 Ruchniewicz
also analyses the interview with Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the
rightist-populist Law and Justice Party, who stated that Polish-German
cooperation after the Cold War was the forced one and Polish elites were
compliant towards Germany (Jarosław Kaczyński, 2017).12
The earlier breaking point in the bilateral relations was the activity of
Erika Steinbach, and her activity in establishing the Centre Against
Expulsions Foundation, which became the political issue before the elections
in the Bundestag in 2005 (Turek, 2018, p. 39). Together with the Prussian
Trust, an organization of German expellees established in 2000 made claims
on the real estate left in Poland (Turek, 2019, p. 37). Poland perceived these
activities as anti-Polish and depicting Germans as victims (Ziemer, 2005, p.
58). The German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder clearly stated that the
attempts to claim in the courts were not supported by the German
government (Ziemer, 2005, pp. 49-50).
The above-mentioned strengths (mainly depicted here as the
contemporary societal activities, assuming that the political rapprochement
is done) and weaknesses, caused by the activity of certain politicians, can
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become a clue for the Western Balkans seeking reconciliation. The activity of
the politicians (even very important as Kaczyński in contemporary Poland,
the leader of the majority party Law and Justice), cannot reverse elaborated
reconciliation, but can significantly spoil it for a period of time. The solid
ground is crucial, and the social exchange that raises the awareness of the
other side can keep the fruits of reconciliation in a more difficult environment. 
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this article was to answer the question is there a universal
pattern for reconciliation? In this paper, I attempted to present as case
studies two different histories of post-war bilateral relations – in Europe and
Asia. The case countries seem to be similar when taking into consideration
the history of their relations, the trauma that was left in the societies after
the war atrocities, and their contemporary role in the international society.
Nonetheless, despite the similarities, the rapprochement process in Europe
and Asia worked diametrically differently. 
For sure, there is no universal pattern for reconciliation. Reconciliation
is a never-ending process with its successes and failures. For sure, the role
of the societal and religious organizations in the case of Poland and
Germany used the opportunity of making first and very important steps to
start this difficult and hard process of approaching to each other. These steps
were taken when the burdens were still fresh. In the case of Korea, soon after
gaining back independence after more than thirty years, the next tragic event
took place, which left more scars on the societal structure – the Korean War.
The interest of the big patron, the United States, and its occupational policy
towards Japan, which enabled the country to stand beside all the military
conflicts benefiting economically from the cooperation with the US, created
the feeling of unfairness and the hard start from the beginning to establish
the bilateral dialogue. The religion, which was the helpful spark for
reconciliation in Europe, was not the case in Asia, where together with the
occupational policy, the Japanese traditional religion – Shintoism (state
version) was implemented. 
The ongoing process of reconciliation in the case of West Germany was
the outcome of Ostpolitik realized from the end of the 1960s. The Polish-East
German relations were built on both countries’ communist system and the
need for the cooperation of the countries staying in the Soviet bloc. The end
of the Cold War, and the active participation in the process of reconciliation
of the societal and religious circles, helped to add to the official policy the
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aspect of rapprochement in which both sides played an active role – in this
case it was the mass in Krzyżowa. This work of memory enabled future
cooperation on the multidimensional level. The active role in introducing
Poland to the organizations in which it became an equal partner for sure
helped the societies to cooperate. The programs of the cooperation between
the citizens of both courtiers, enforced by the opportunities given by the
European Union (such as student exchange, legal work) or the free citizens’
flow, strengthened the aspects of cooperation between the society and
politicians. 
In the case of Asian countries, history became a tool in the political
campaign and is used to build the spirit of the nation. Even though there is
the existence of a significant interest in other side’s culture, the reconciliation
process that was forced from the beginning effectively prevents agreement.
Therefore, even though the universal pattern for reconciliation does not
exist, some aspects were characterized in this paper as helpful and
disturbing in the process. Among them we can define:
• The victim’s side should also be active in the process, not leaving
reconciliation only to the former aggressor’s side. 
• Societal cooperation, such as exchange programs helps build
rapprochement.
• The usage of history as a tool in gaining political power, when there is
no strong reconciliation movements’ history, disables and even pushes
back possible rapprochement.
• Reconciliation should come from the need of the country (even if only
one) or the certain benefit it wants to achieve in the international
environment, not from outside pressure. 
The Western Balkans, the region in Europe which was torn apart by
wars after the fall of Yugoslavia, can for sure benefit from the interest of the
European Union and the help of this organization in building peace and
reconciliation in the region, together with the incorporation of all the states
into this supranational organization. For sure, for the Balkans, it is easier to
learn from the Polish-German experience because of the European roots of
these countries. The Balkans have the path trodden by the central European
countries – the EU member states. But it is also beneficial to look at the
mistakes committed by the Asian countries. The EU cannot force the
Western Balkans countries to reconcile. They need to find the benefit coming
from the process of reconciliation and try to perceive how it helped Poland
and Germany. 
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